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ANALYSIS OF THE MAIN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES OF THE CSCE COUNTRIES AND JAPAN

by Peter Klerks1

Contents

1   Introduction

2   Threats
2.1     Espionage
2.2     Terrorism
2.3     Proliferation
2.4     Clandestine arms trafficking
2.5     Migration
2.6     Domestic subversion from the left
2.7     Extreme right; racism
2.8     Islamic fundamentalism
2.9     Vulnerability of high-tech societies
2.10    Cults and sects
2.11    Environmental problems
2.12    Secessionist movements

3   Organized crime and corruption
3.1     The Commonwealth of Independent States and
        Eastern Europe
3.2     Western Europe
3.3     Drug trafficking
3.4     A Converging of law enforcement and
        intelligence objectives and methods?

4   Financial intelligence

5   Military intelligence
5.1     Innovations in intelligence-related warfare
5.2     Peace-keeping and peace-enforcing operations

6   Interests and activities on other continents
6.1     Introduction
6.2     The Middle East
6.3     Africa

7   Intelligence cooperation
7.1     The European dimension
7.2     NATO
7.3     Eastern Europe and former Soviet states

8   Open sources intelligence

9   Non-governmental intelligence
9.1     Introduction
9.2     Economic intelligence
9.3     Corporate intelligence
9.4     Intelligence buccaneers
9.5     Intelligence activities by insurgent groups
        and criminals
9.6     Intelligence and academic institutes

10  Reorganizations and trends


"This, gentlemen, is espionage a middle-class
activity that depends on stability, money, large doses of
hypocrisy on both sides, insurance plans, grievances,
underlying loyalty, constant inclinations toward
treachery, and an immersion in white-collar work. See you
next week. Before too long, we will come to more damnable
stuff counterespionage. That is where we say farewell to
white-collar mentality."

(Harlot teaching CIA neophytes)
Norman Mailer - Harlot's ghost.


1  INTRODUCTION


Analyzing a phenomenon as wide and diverse as the current
state and future trends of security and intelligence
services in Europe, the former USSR, the Northamerican
continent and Japan seems too ambitious. The problems
besetting a commander of a military intelligence service
in Croatia can hardly be discussed in the same chapter as
those of, say, an official responsible for patents
research in a Japanese ministry. It is unrealistic to
assess developments even in a single government
bureaucracy if one is not thoroughly familiar with the
context of local customs and traditions, the power
structure, recent political history and relevant
legislation. Furthermore, the previous chapters
demonstrate that in looking at a country's intelligence
structure, it should not be assumed that they all work as
a unified, coherent ensemble toward an unequivocal common
goal. Rather, in most countries we can expect to find
several rivaling players, sometimes with little if any
overall coherence or allegiance to the policies of the
ruling government.

With all that in mind, this analytical chapter has been
written in an awareness of modesty, perhaps even
futility, but it has been written all the same. Armed
with the information assembled in the previous chapters
and looking at current events in the global political
arena, at crime trends, at military situations and
economic trends, one can distinguish certain
possibilities and probabilities that together may shed
some light on the agendas of today's intelligence
executives.


2  THREATS


2.1 Espionage

When speaking of counterintelligence, operators normally
differentiate between security as the passive  and
counterespionage as the offensive dimension. We will
argue here that the security dimension has become
increasingly dominant over the last five years.
Judging on statements made in public, for most security
services counterterrorism has surpassed
counterintelligence on the priorities list, with economic
espionage ranking a close second.2 In daily routine
however the classic mission of security agencies,
catching spies, is often still dominant. The difference
is that nowadays, the spy to look out for probably no
longer works for the Russians. The breakdown of the
Soviet empire and the East European regimes ended the
formal existence of nearly a dozen very professional,
powerful and determined espionage agencies. Together they
had run many thousands of spies who had penetrated all
levels of the western societies, including governments,
banks, and intelligence agencies.The number of spies has
decreased immensely; most of the remaining spies no
longer operate under the control and doctrines of Moscow,
and the East-West confrontation is no longer the alpha
and omega of the spy business.

But there's nothing new to the nature and missions of
many other players in the field. 'Friendly' spies have
always been active trying to catch the ally's secrets,
and 'communist' spies have never had a monopoly on
industrial and scientific espionage. Industrial
corporations, professional intelligence brokers, Asian
Tigers and criminal organizations are all interested in
resourceful R&D departments. Information technology has
thoroughly changed the way industries and bureaucracies
function. Advanced organizations depend on their
information being directly accessible from any desk in
the building, or even from outside through computer
networks. Access control therefore is no longer a matter
of locking the secrets in the vault and checking the
windows. Spies relying on their Minox camera have become
relics of the past.

The consequences of all this remain unclear. Money and
blackmail have always been the prime motives for spying,
that doesn't really change. A slight ease of tension
could be expected within the security services
themselves, assuming that senior intelligence personnel
is now less likely to come under suspicion of working for
the other side. Constant paranoia must have caused
considerable pressures in the traditional spy business:
consider once again that the heads of the West German,
Swedish and Canadian counterintelligence services, among
others, have all been convicted or forced into retirement
because of 'mole' allegations. Nowadays, most of the
'other sides' probably couldn't mount such delicate
operations over any period of time for lack of
institutional resources and professionalism. On the other
hand, the amicability of many senior intelligence people
with corporate executives raises questions of integrity
and suggests some influence of old boys' networks on the
functioning of government intelligence services.

Under new management, the Ruskies are still in business
and deserve attention: Ames proved a case in point. But
could any western intelligence service afford to miss the
opportunity of having an asset in the top of their
neighbor's intelligence service? Would they risk the
embarrassment and damage of walking into a sting
operation? And would they be as aggressive and convincing
in actively recruiting a prospective agent-in-place as
the KGB once was?

In the end it's still business as usual. The country
reports in this book illustrate that all national
security agencies still go around classifying materials
and identifying weak spots; some have explicitly turned
to the business community to advertise these services.
Nothing much really seems to change, except that
(offensive) counterespionage has become more difficult
given the diffuse character of the adversaries. The old
anti-communist orientation has given way to a more common
conservative and often nationalist attitude. The emphasis
is now more on protecting the family jewels: identifying
and reducing vulnerabilities and protecting potential
targets against threats, no matter where these come from.
This also explains why the old security vetting systems
are usually still in place, and are even expanded to new
areas and functions such as information technology
services (network operators, database managers, and both
inhouse and third-party computer consultants). Instead of
reducing the number of security posts, governments and
corporations are in fact increasing the number of jobs
that require screening on political, criminal and other
(e.g., drug use) background and habits.

The increased orientation on fostering defenses tends to
bring more sophistication into both government and
private security operations. There is an increasing
awareness of technical and organizational aspects of
active security countermeasures outside traditional
military and intelligence agencies.3 In law enforcement
operations for example, the concept of operations
security (OPSEC) is gaining ground outside the DEA and
similar sophisticated outfits. OPSEC involves the
protecting of generally unclassified evidence of the
planning and execution of sensitive activities. This
includes the attempted disguise or concealment of
indicators which, when pieced together or interpreted,
may betray critical information. Indicators often occur
in support functions like travel, finance and logistics;
sometimes what gives the game away is a sudden
stereotyped pattern of activities, or just the opposite,
a departure from normal patterns. A well-known example is
the intelligence service headquarters where on an
identified floor, shortly before an operation breaks all
the lights burn all night. The countermeasure actually
taken in this case was to have the janitor switch the
lights on and off throughout the building in a random
pattern. More elaborate examples include the use of phony
bank accounts and safehouses.4


2.2  Terrorism


Although many of the notorious names of the 1970s and
1980s such as Carlos, the RAF, Action Directe, and the
Brigate Rosse have been moved from the active to the
archive files, political violence remains a phenomenon to
be reckoned with.5 The PIRA and the ETA continue to
operate at the time of writing, albeit on a lower level,
and other groups such as the various fundamentalist
Muslim factions (discussed below) seem to be gaining in
militancy and strength. In some cases, foreign state
forces appear to be responsible for planning, funding or
executing terrorist incidents in Europe and elsewhere.
Intelligence services play a crucial role in
antiterrorist operations, both in the warning and the
investigation phases: experts estimate that between 70
and 80 per cent of the relevant information relating to
terrorism comes from clandestine sources.

Many debates have centered around the proper definition
of terrorism. Researchers Schmid and Jongman of Leiden
University have analyzed all the varieties used in
academic literature and came up with a one-page
compromize.6 Although some 'enlightened' security
services will concede that political activists using
violence against objects are not necessarily terrorists,
this seems to put few if any restrictions to the measures
applied to track them down. In Holland for example,
people suspected by the BVD to have been engaged in such
activities have been harrassed, intimidated and their
houses have been bugged.7 Other West European countries
such as Germany, the UK and Belgium present roughly the
same picture.

One of the conflicts being fought over in Europe today is
the struggle for autonomy of the Turkish Kurds. The
guerrilla struggle in East Turkey is mainly fought by
Kurds organized in the Patiya Karkeren Kurdistan (the
Kurdish Workers Party or PKK), which is both an armed
freedom movement and a political party with a stalinist
program. The PKK appears to be representing the majority
of the Kurdish population both in Turkey and in the rest
of Europe, although reliable estimates cannot be made.
Both the Kurds and the Turkish government face the
dilemma of having to fight a dirty civil war while
maintaining a 'civilized' image in the rest of Europe.
The Kurds are not too good at it: while they obviously
suffer under fierce repression, they appear to resort to
raising money in European cities through extortion
rackets and, according to some sources, profiting from
money gained in the heroin trade. PKK supporters have
been accused of levying 'revolutionary taxes' in Germany,
Holland and Belgium. In Holland PKK members received
prison sentences on such charges for the first time in
1994.8 In Germany, where the largest population of
European Kurds reside including an estimated 3,800 PKK
members, the government has outlawed the PKK and related
organizations in November 1993.9

To make matters more complicated, a number of terrorist
attacks and assassinations in European countries have
reportedly been carried out by the covert arm of the
Turkish government. In Turkey itself political killings
from all sides are almost routine, with 11,000 deaths
since the outbreak of the Kurdish conflict in 1984. But
in Western European countries political refugees are also
threatened and killed. The problem for outsiders and
police investigators is that it is often impossible to
distinguish between operations carried out by forces
connected to the Turkish government and violence
resulting from internecine conflicts between e.g.
different Kurdish factions or drug-related killings. PKK
representatives have repeatedly accused the Iraqi Kurdish
Democratic Party of collaborating with Turkish
intelligence. The PKK also blamed the killing of
prominent Kurds living in exile such as Imdat Yilmaz,
chair of the Kurdistan Committee in Copenhagen, on the
Turkish intelligence service MIT. The PKK on the other
hand has a stated policy of attacking Turkish government
installations throughout Europe.10

The measures taken to protect political refugees against
physical attacks by their country's intelligence services
vary considerably from country to country. For example,
whereas in Germany certain Iranian dissident leaders are
protected by armed escorts, the Dutch authorities most
often limit themselves to advising to keep a low profile
and passing on unspecified threat alerts. Which after all
is still better than the French, who may simply extradict
'troublemakers' back to the gallows in their homeland.

Apart from the operational need to keep in touch with the
Turkish police for cooperation in criminal (mainly
narcotics) cases and with the MIT to try and prevent or
solve terrorist attacks, European services cannot afford
to spoil their relations with the MIT since it is
uniquely placed to supply much-wanted information on
activities by the Iranian Ministry of Information and
Security (MOIS), which reportedly also runs terrorist
networks in Europe. Added to this comes the obvious
status of Turkey as a member of NATO and its strategic
key position in monitoring developments in the southern
republics of the former Soviet Union. The considerable
Turkish appetite for military hardware is an additional
stimulus for countries with an arms industry in need of
export orders.

Repeated Iranian death squad activities have been
reported by refugees living in Europe. Yet many
governments, including the German authorities, seem to
ignore such signals and prefer to continue the
relationship with Iran.11 The BfV however is fully aware
of the very real threats posed by the Iranians, as their
largest intelligence station in Europe, estimated at some
two dozen staff, is situated at the Iranian embassy in
Bonn. According to press sources citing confidential BfV
reports, the Verfassungsschutz is convinced that the
Iranians assassinated four Kurd leaders in Berlin on 17
September 1992.12 In a parallel development, the British
government has recently accused Iran of plotting with the
Provisional IRA to supply guns and money in turn for
murdering Iranian dissidents in Europe. The Provos
apparently turned down the offer.13

That anti-terrorist intelligence operations can lead to
serious collisions with 'friendly' governments was
illustrated in a recent case when Irish Garda Special
Branch and G2 army intelligence officers uncovered a
massive British Security Service network in Ireland.14 The
Irish police investigators have suggested that the spies
in this network not only kept alleged PIRA members under
surveillance, but that any individual with political,
military or commercial influence was regarded as a
"desirable target" by MI5. The Garda police service was
also concerned that a number of its officers had been
compromized by MI5 as part of a "dirty tricks" campaign.


2.3  Proliferation


U.S. government reports have identified as the most
serious risk to America's national security today  the
global proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons, as well as the spread of conventional armaments.15
About a dozen states are believed to be seeking to obtain
or develop nuclear capabilities.16 The exact status of
their nuclear programs remains unknown. Apart from the
'Big Five', the Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Israel,
South Africa, India and Pakistan already have nuclear
weapons.17 Chemical weapons are thought to be acquired by
about twenty countries, many of which also have ballistic
missiles to deliver the chemical warheads. All this sets
the stage for possible future high-intensity conflicts.
The CIA has estimated that within a decade, at least one
Third World country would be able to combine nuclear
warheads with missiles capable of striking the United
States.

Apart from the Korean peninsula, the area with the
highest risk of a nuclear conflict seems to be the Indian
subcontinent, where India and Pakistan have been involved
in a permanent state of conflict since the independence
and partition 1947. This has brought three wars in 1947,
1965 and 1971, and observers fear that the unstable
situation in Kashmir, where the Pakistani government is
supporting Islamic fundamentalist seccesionists, could
lead to new war. With both countries almost certainly
posessing nuclear weapons, this could become an
unprecendented disaster. U.S. journalists Bill Burrows
and Bob Windrem have described how the two countries were
on the brink of exactly such a nuclear conflict in 1990,
when U.S. intelligence agencies received alarming
indications of Pakistani preparations for an imminent
nuclear first strike.18 An urgent mission to the area by
National Security Advisor Robert Gates apparently
resulted in a cooling down of the tensions, but a senior
CIA official later told top journalist Seymour Hersh the
world had never before been so close to a nuclear war.
On 17 May 1994, the International Herald Tribune wrote
that reliable Pakistani military sources had said
Pakistan had suspended active support for the insurgency
in Indian Kashmir the year before when the U.S.
threatened to add it to the list of countries sponsoring
terrorism. Such a move would have required automatic
severing of U.S.-Pakistani aid and business ties. During
the hiatus, Pakistan apparently "privatized" its Kashmir
operations, funneling support to the militants through
nongovernmental organizations that were often run by
retired army and intelligence officials. After the U.S.
decided not to add Pakistan to the terrorist list,
however, the army in early 1994 resumed its active
Kashmir operations, although at a much reduced level.
Pakistani political and government officials denied any
active role in arming or training militants in Kashmir,
saying their support was limited to aiding the insurgents
through political diplomatic initiatives.19

Among the more worrying expectations of European
securocrats is the crisis scenario of Libyan missiles
armed with nuclear or chemical warheads and pointed at
European capitals, most of which would be within their
range. In anticipation of such a risk the British Defence
Ministry is studying a limited anti-ballistic missile
system, and France is discussing building its own anti-
tactical ballistic missile system.20 Battlefield
experience during the second Gulf war has shown how
difficult it is even with the best intelligence
capabilities available to track down and destroy mobile
missile launchers. In launching their Scuds, the Iraqi's
skipped most of the usual calibration procedures and
arrived, launched and were vanished again in no time.
Also U.S. intelligence had great trouble identifying and
pinpointing elements of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program
that could be moved and concealed.21

The Libyans reportedly depend to some extent on
clandestine German connections for keeping their German-
supplied installations for producing chemical warfare
agents running. Little wonder that German intelligence
and security services count Libya among their many
operational targets, as was once again illustrated when
Mr Silvan Becker, one of the Verfassungsschutzes' senior
terrorism experts, was abducted from Egypt and killed in
Libya. Mr Becker was believed to have been collecting
intelligence on Libyan chemical plants and intelligence
capabilities.22

CIA top officals have recently warned that North Korea
would be planning to sell nuclear warheads plus delivery
systems to countries such as Iran, Syria and Libya.23 With
a range of about 1300 kilometers, North-Korean Nodong
missiles currently under development would thus be able
to hit large parts of Southern Europe.24 CIA analysts
reportedly estimated the current North-Korean nuclear
arsenal at two warheads, with the capacity to grow to
about ten warheads in the next five years. It remained
unclear to what extent such reports where part of the
psychological warfare resulting from the Korean crisis in
the summer of 1994.25

Undoubtedly, intelligence services around the world will
be spending an increasing amount of money and resources
on counterproliferation in the coming years. In the U.S.,
the DCI has created the Nonproliferation Center to
coordinate all intelligence efforts related to
proliferation, and all branches of the intelligence
community are boosting their research and collection
efforts. So far, there has been a strong emphasis on the
collection and interpretation of technical intelligence,
but experts are now urging for more HUMINT input. Only
human observers on the scene are likely to pick up
valuable information on e.g. opposition in government
circles or the army, budget arguments or policy
considerations that may influence decision-making
regarding unconventional arms programs.26

The most serious, or at least the most sizeable problem
is presented by the former Soviet nonconventional arms
arsenal and nuclear installations. Soviet nuclear
warheads are supposedly guarded by the army and protected
against accidental or unauthorized use through a socalled
Permissive Action Link.27 However, the smaller Russian
tactical weapons such as 152 mm artillery shells do not
have such protective devices and are thus no more
difficult to detonate than a conventional shell or
missile warhead. U.S. estimates say some 15,000 tactical
warheads are now in Russia, among them many old and
primitive systems protected by little more than a
padlocked cover.

In the summer of 1994, tensions were building up over
alleged smuggling of nuclear materials orginating from
the former Soviet Union. In June Mr Bernd Schmidbauer,
swashbuckling coordinator of the German intelligence
services and nicknamed '008', claimed to have information
indicating that Russian criminal organizations possessed
the materials that would enable them to produce nuclear
weapons.28 Some days later, on his 10-day trip to Russia
and other East European nations in June and July 1994 FBI
Director Louis Freeh declared that "the greatest longterm
threat to the security of the United States" is the
possibility that organized criminals will steal a nuclear
weapon or materials to make one from the former Soviet
Union and sell it to terrorists." However, Mr Freeh said
he had no indications that organized criminals had
actually gotten access to nuclear weapons.29

[This is the first 25K of a total text of over 200K.  For a
full copy of this report, please send an email request to
intelligence-adi@wanadoo.fr]

                           *